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ourselves, to exert gre ter efforts &nd ev nt lly, to contribut in ure 
toward tbe &hartening of t war. Lt. n ral /.1 rt ede y r did re t job 
as the China th ater co derJ wr. lklnb.ld Nelson laid the ground or for 
Chinese J and General Hurley oontributed W'ltiringl.y of his effort to pro110te 
good will between the U.s.s.R. imd China and w1thin China, to unity b tween the 
Central Go,.rnment and Yenan. 
There ia no doubt, in rq mind, that General Hurley had much to do with laying 
the ground work tor the Soong-5talin Treaty or last August hich further strengthened 
the govern.nt of Chiang ~i-shek and which I think as ~ good agreement tor both 
coW'ltriea . 
Since the surrender of Japan the situation in China has deteriorated to a great 
extent. ithin a few days a!ter Japan's collapee we sent in the First Warine Divi-
sion to Tsku and Tientsin and followed this by sendlllg the Sixth lfarine v:l.sion to 
T81ngtao and el.fsewhere in Shantung and also the Seventh United States Fleet under 
Admiral Daniel Barbey. Why all these elements were sent to north China was not made 
clear to the American public in the beginning and, as near as I can fiad out, they 
were acting under orders of the joint chiefs or staff and, I believe, without the 
knowledge, in the beginning, of the State Department. This indicntee to 1118 that 
liaison within the top reaches of the Government 1a not very close. It points up 
the need for such a top level relationship between the &tate, Nllvy, nd ar Depart-
ments which, incidentally, wu one of 1111 recollll8ndat1ona to President Roosevelt on 
lilY return from China latJt January. Later, as public questioning increttsed, it was 
stated that we were bound by our oomitm«mts to the Central Oovel'tlJII8nt of China to 
help disaJ"Dl the Jape and that our forces would be withdrnn very shortly. 
&:>wever, reports out of China stated that by January l, 1946, only 6,000 of 
our soldiers would re in in that coWlt.ry - eh01ring a good sized withdrawal ot our 
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China theater p rsonnel - but that 53,000 marines and undi cloaed thousands ot 
naval personnel -would re in for an indefinite period of time. This did not stop 
th cla r for the ldthdraw&l of our men but only increased suspicion that we in-
tended to continue to intervene in what many or us consider to be p..u-ely a Chinese 
internal problem. 
Then, on November :21, Secretary of State Byrne issued a statement as followsa 
The United States Government will keep armed forces in north China until 
it has carried out a pledge to the J panese Government to effectuate the surrender 
of all Japanese troops in China and transport them to their homeland. 
The question arises, fuy was this atatemmt made 3 months after Japan•a sur-
render? Furthermore, what was so secret about it that kept it froll being made 
public immediately after it was agreed to? It appeara to me that had the latter 
course been follo ed the American public would have accepted it, the reasonl tor 
our pursuing such a policy would have bettn understood and the present disquietina 
situation avoided. It must be understood that our China polic.y, until J pan•a 
surrender, was clear and above board. Our postwar policy, then, and our reuon 
tor eending marines and naval personnel into north China is to disarm Japanese 
· troops there. The next question is, lbw many Japanese troops are there and bow 
lofli will it take to disarm them. I have tried to find out the approximate number 
ot armed Japanese but I find no agreement on the total . According to a letter rroa 
Tientsin to the St. Louia Post-Dispatch i .t is stated that 1 
General Ho Ying-chin, Conmander in Chief of the Chinese Army, announced on 
October 30 that except tor remnants at &Jpei and ShantWlg, 90 perc~nt ot the 
Japanese troops have been disarmed in the Chinese theater. 
In the New york Times of' November 30 the following etatemont is madea 
General & Ying-chin, Commander in Chief of Chinese field forces said all 
Japanese forces in China had been disarmed with the exception of 100,000 in Hupeh 
and Shantung Provinces . 
On December 7, the Chinese News Service, an agency of the Chinese Governaent, 
stated that 1 
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G neral Ho Ying-chin Co..aander in Chi f of th Chin se 
that of all th Japan e troops in Chin over (;0 perc t has b 
disarm d . 
Later, 1n th e story, oen ral H:> asserted "that hi& 
the J paneee - ttwill b completed within thi.fi onth. • In the , 
- di in or 
o tot 
November 29, General Hurley iB quoted as saying there are still on to two million 
Japanese 1n China . Whether or not they are all armed ia not stated. The ntrWB-
paper on November 25, said there were 3001 000 Japanese soldiers and civilians in 
north China and on November 28 it carried another tor,y which said there were J , OOO, 
000 Japanese soldiers and civllikilB there . On November 27 I also found out froa an 
authoritative personal source that there were 500,000 armed Japanese aoldiera and 
800,000 Japanese civilians there. 
The Pathfinder, a national weekly, states in its issue of Deoember 5 tbkt 
Secretary or State Byrnes "estimated 300,000 Japanese soldiers and 30,000 of their 
civilians remain in n01·th China. " The United States News for December 7, atatea 
"The firBt task of 'eneral arshall will be to aid in d1s811Ding the 1,000,000 J pan-
ese who still are in China . " 
It ia hard to reconcile all these figures and they exemplify, by their disparity, 
the confusion or aind which exist& in this country. In ~ opinion, the n\lllber ot 
Japan••• soldittrs who need to be disarmed nusbero between 100,000 and 500,000. In 
line 111. th our signed agreement with Japan on August 16, we 'have to keep our pledge 
to disarm. these soldiers . I feel, though, that a definite date should be eet where-
by these soldifJr& should be disarmed and our boys on their way homo. That they all 
should have been disarmed before this is obvious but our pledge must be kept. 1 t 
is 1111 underata ndi.ng that we will not have anything to oo with repatriating Japanese 
civilian personnel, so under these circumstances, the task of di.BM.rming Japan'& 
soldiers should not take our 531000 marines too long. 
There has been a great deal said aoout collllllUI'lism 1n China, 1n our State part-
ment, and Russia •• position in China. These questions should all be considered in 
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the light of facts and not innuendoes . General HUrley in discussing the Communists 
in China stated there might be some among thea who look to osoow !or guidance, but 
be tb::>ught most or them were just reformers-outs who wanted to be the ina . 
"The only difference between Chinese Communi.stli and Oklaho&ll Republicans," he 
said, "is that the Oklahoma Republicans are not armed. " 
There re otber differences which should be noted such as the fact that the 
Chinese Co uniat Party has its own laws, currency, tax system, and government, and 
also that whUe the lsaders like o Tee-tung, Chu Teh, Chou En-lai, Md others are 
Marxist ColllllllJliBts 1 the great IDBBs of the people in the areas under their control are 
as General Hurley puts it, "reformers" in an agrarian sense. 
In the matter or Russia and its position I should like to quote a news story 
on General Hurley's Pres Club ~peach carried in tho na&hington Post issue ot 
November 29, 1945s 
Vaj . Gen . Patrick J . Hurley, who thi.nks the American people deserve more 
information about fore~n affai~s, yesterday told the story or tho 1944 conference 
w:i. th artJhal Stalin in the Kremlin. He said the interview convinced him that, in 
Stalin's opinion, the Chinese Comn:unists were not Comm\.ll1.8ts at ~. 
Tbe position ot both .&l.arshal Stalin and Foreign COJII!lieaar J4olotov, Hurley said, 
was that Russia waa not supporting the Chinese Communist Part,.-, that she would aup_port 
the govern•nt and 1. adership or QeneralisaiDJ Chiting Kai-shek, and that she desired 
more harmonious relatione with Chin • 
General Hurley said that when he reported all this to the Chinese leaders in 
Chungking, they could hardly believe it . Then T. V. Soon-a, China's Foreign Jiinister, 
went to scow and in Augu~t there was aolemized a 30-yoar treaty in which Russia 
agreed to support Chiang Kai-ahek' s govern~~~tnt and agreed further to get out ot 
Manchuria and recognize China's Bovereignty there. 
"In all justice to Stalin and olotovn 1 Hurley sa~d, •I must ~ate that not tor 
one mo ent while I wae in China did they ever break their lf'Ord with me. " 
The Soong..Stalin treaty of August 14 cert5.1nly was a pledge of outright support 
to Chungking Wid was anything but welcomed by the Chinese Comuniats . According to 
the pres , it would appear that the Russ1ans in lfl4nchuria are pursuing a double 
course ot "eaiating the Chinese Communists and hindering the entry of Kuomintang 
troops. It is extremely hard to get a realJ.y accurate picture of ...t"fain in Manchuria, 
but on the basis of late reports it Beems to be shaping up as follows l 
According to the Cbristian Scieftce ronitor of November 291 the Ruaai&na are 
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tri.thdr wing fro nchuria on chedule. bout t Char t t th Ru ian& 
are stripping the country ot raac~&r;~ tind leaving th fivld to th Chin • 
ColllllUni.Bts, this paper statea t Russi.llrls are ing no official th r 
these chaJ.ri are true or not, I ao not knawr, as Chungking it t~lf ha aid nothin& 
official concerning the~. 
The llew York Time ot 1~v ber 30 ke the followin state nts 1 
The :Moscow radio said toni(Jl t that Russia hks •consented" t.o Chinese 
request that it. deter "for eo• time" witbdr&.wal of nuasian troops .froa Nanchuria. 
The broadcast * said China had asked tor the postponement becaUSE! •the 
Chinese Government as encounterin considerable ditficulty in transferring troope 
to nchuri& oldng to the presence ot Chinese non-Qovernll:8nt troops 1n so place •" 
The Russ1.ans, according to the broadcast, had planned the withdrawal or troops 
by Decemb3r 12, in accordance with ttw Russian-chinese trvaty or August 14, by 1lh ich 
Russia recognized China's eoveroignty in anchuria. 
The radio reported the Chinese as &ayi.ng that their Central Government "would 
not be able by that date (December l2) to transfer its troops and organize a civil 
administration in Yanchuria, and said the Russian acceptance of the rvquest w greeted 
with great oatisfaction in China. 
The ashinuton Post or December 2 carries the following atatementa 
Veamrhlle, Chungking got a great lift from the official announcemnt of a 
new Soviet agreement under which the Russians will ~1&7 until January 3 their 
withdrawal from vital Manchuria. 
This 1-month postponeroent will give the Chungking government time to send 
administrative personnel l.lnd troops into strategic cities of anchuri.a ahead ot 
Gbinese Communists . 
It would appear, therefore, on the basis of these press reports that the letter, 
I 
if not the full spirit, of the Soong.Stalin treaty is being carried out 1n regard 
to Ruaaian withdrawal from Manchuria. 
In the matter of Colll!lunist aympathizera in the Far :.astern Divi.Bion of the 
State DeparttiM!Ilt I can only say on the basu of a short personal acquaintance durin& 
my Jniasion to China for President Roosevelt lest year wit•t \leesrs. Oeorge Atch son, 
Arthur Ringwalt, Fulton Freeman, sod others whoa I met in the E basay at Chungking 
that they are high type, conscientious, patri0tic Americana. The implication toot 
these men have fallen down in their ret:iponsibilities is an impression that I do not 
share• because their interests have first and foremost been in our comtry•• behalf. 
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Personally, I have every confidence in them and until proved ot herwiae I am 
delighted that we can continue to havo the use of their valuable and outstandin& 
services 1n the Stat Department . 
There has also been some adverse comment about our military leadership in 
China. Our Chinese theater coJIU'IIander, Lt . Gen . Albert c. Wedemeyer, has done an 
outstanding job there. e are extremely fortunate in having a man of his caliber 
and understanding in this particular spot . I know there has been some criticism 
of his activities in Ch1na1 s post war situation, but I think it is only fair to 
estate that he io acting under the orders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff anC. not on 
hiG own respon6ibility. 
It is interesting to note in this respect that on December 8 Gen . Douglas 
llacArthur, n!ter a .2-day top socret Tokyo conference with Admiral Spruance, Pacific 
Fleet Commander; Vice Adnrl.r5l arbey, of the United [:tates Seventh Fleet; and Gen. 
Wedemeyer announced that rocommEJndatione would be made to the Joint Chiefs of Starr 
regarding "repatriation of Japanese troops i.'"l China "nd allocation of resources . " 
1 suppose the "resources" refers to tho disposition of American troope and material 
in China . Is it possible that the Joint Chiefe of Staff have been making our 
foreign policy in China and elsewhere rather than our 01m State Department'? 
General Wedemeyer has been critieized by certain elements in this oountcy and 
in China because he t~a not replied to a communication received some weeks ago 
by General Chu Teh, commander in chief of the Chinese Communists which protested 
American int~rvention in China. ~s answer stated hie position quite clearly when 
he said"By direction of my Government, I deal only with the CentrAl Government of 
China . Government does not recognize any other eovernment in China. " In this 
he i.8 correct. 
When questioned about the presence o£ a United States liaison group at Com-
munist headquarters in Yonan which suppoaedly implied recognition of the Communist 
government he stated that the group was there when he came to China and that its job 
was to report on Japanese operations and fa~ilitate the return of American fliers 
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forced do11111 in Colllllrlist nd J panese held t rritory. dd d t t h d not 
remo• d th group with the nd of the becau e uch m:>V 11 ht 
terpreted11 b7 the Co uni t • Had GenerRl e yer been in favor of ll-<n1t 
intervention again t the ColDIIUnists he would not have adopted the sane and ound 
policy 1n this instance. 
About the position of the United States in China we recognize only the 
Chwgking Govel'lllll6nt of Chiang Kai-shek, ThiM 1s the govern.l'llent recognized by 
Brit1an, the U.S . S.R. and every other country carrying on relation with the Chinese 
Republic and thia should continue to be our polio7. Through Ambassador Oausa and 
lfu.rley and Generals Stilwell and edemeyer we have done our best to bring the 
Kuolli.ntang and the Co1111uniste together. This we should continue to ch but not through 
the device of armed intervention. To uphold Chiaog and his government we are 
helping to disarm Japanese troops, w have transported Koumint.ang troops by ea 
and air to Shantung, and we have sent 1n l&arines to hold certain areu untU luomin-
tang troops could get thore and take over. 
Ju.st who waa directly responsible for all thi& I do not know tor sure. Certa1nl7 
no Ambassador had that auch power &nd certainly General edemeyer Wa& not acting on 
his own authoritY'• The Secretary of State denied any knowledge of the use ot 
Karines in North China 1n mid Aueu&t so the only place wlwre thi authority could 
have come from would be the Joint Chiefs of Staff here in ashington. Thia, ot 
course, brings our new Ambassador to China. Gen. George c. Marshall, into the 
picture. Somebody, somewhere, made a recollllD9ndation to ta&hington as to what our 
policy 1n China should )M. General Marshall known- or can find out- who made the 
reco .. ndation .from the field . He known, I am sure, far 111ore about the Chinese 
situation than many China experts and 1 feel he will look into this aaituation with 
out tear or favor and will w hie beBt, &s always, for his country and hi& people. 
He 1a well acquainted with StUweU, edemeyer, and Hurl.ey; he has an open 
mind, and he will not be swayed by friendship but by .facts. Able, frien~, and 
with tremendoua prestige he :-o-11 serve ua well. 
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The appointJU!mt of oen. George c. sho.ll as our new Aubaasador to China 1.8, 
in rq opinion, tba best poQsible choice this country could mke. He has been given, 
not only the most difficult but also one of the most thankless joba in the w:.>rld. 
His appointment shows how important we consider China end how dif ieult or solution 
th Chinese problem is . His prestige, courage, and common sense will all be needAtd 
in the greatest degree. Perhaps the probl is not capAble of aolutionJ but it we 
have any one n woo can unlock the key to the Chinese puzzle, that IIIIUl i8 General 
1iarshall. 
The post of Ambassador to China not only holds the key to Sino-American relations 
but it also, in rq opinion, holds a p::rt of the answer to the queation of Ru•so-
Ameriean relations &18 well. It liWiit be remembered that l&anchuria, where the crwt ot 
the present situation seems to lie, was where .orld ar 11 started in September 1931. 
Let us hope that this terri tory Will not also mark the beginning of orld ar 111. 
I have great confidence that when General atarvhall studies the situation 1n 
China he will make reco•endationa looking forward to the withdrawal ot A.llerican 
troops by a definite date and that he will propose an American policy toward China 
based on good will, tolerance, and 111tual understanding . 
The American people must be kept more fully informed of our forei&n policy so 
that they may know in what direction we are heading. The American congress, 
especially the Senate Foreign Relations Comittee and the House Foreign Attain 
Collllllittee, must also be informed. 
I have spoken on China primarily, but we uhould remember that the Chinese 
situation is tied to the relit or Asia. The ferment 1n China 1a being reputed in 
Indonesia, Indochina, Burma, India, :(ran, Syria, and elsewhere . tihat we need 1.a 
not ao DUch a (,hinese policy as &n Asiatic policy 1 because fundamentally the iaeue 
is the sa through that continent. 
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The real issue in China, in the mind of the erican people, is intervention. 
e haw t1ro choices, either intervene all the way or gat out by a definite date. 
I! we do decide to intervene, which pray we do not, we st be prepllr d to intain 
armed fore in China for years to come because the present ituation will not, ot 
itself, be cleared up overnight. 
e must act promptly to clarify our foreign policy o that we y know, tar 
. 
as possible, just what is going on, why it is being d;)ne, and what expect to 
aocomplish. e must not develop an "iron curtain" of our own. e must continue to 
upb:>ld Alll8rica • a traditional China policy or nonintervention in her internal a!'!airs . 
The settle ment between Chungking and Yen an is a diplomatic pro blea with which our 
troope in China should have no concem. Russia and the United States should offer 
ita good diplomatic o!.t'iceu to stop the conflict, but we should not, under any 
circumstances , p;.rticipate in it. e JIIUSt not allow a situation to develop again , 
in China or elsewhere, where the force of public opinion becomes necessary to brina 
the true story into the open. There has been no need for secrecy in this instance, 
and the results achieved by our calfuuillg postwar China policy should serve as a 
r eminder to ws that the truth and the truth only wUl eatia.ty the American public 
at home and tho American boys who are being forced to do an unpleasant job 1n north 
China today. 
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